The first post (operating) I would like to dedicate this blog to an unwelcome phenomenon that, for almost two years, some of those fateful summer of 2007 that small investors, hoping to shelter their savings from a heavier financial crises of the last century, had the unfortunate idea to choose how to port "safe" for their substance certain mutual funds (or funds of fund) money (or liquidity). Moreover, this phenomenon has rocked even those small investors who, having always had a high risk aversion had, in recent years, chose the cash funds as "valid" (?) Alternative to the feeble performance of bank accounts. It 'worth specifying that, although there is no legally binding definition of the fund (or fund) "money" or "liquidity", these types of funds have always been and uniquely characterized (both by scholars of economics of financial markets as the market participants themselves ... first and foremost an investment company that placed these funds) from investments in bonds (usually with high sovereign credit ratings and / or banking institutions, international) with a maturity of short or very short term (typically six months to two years), as well as bank deposits and repurchase agreements. short these securities to their low risk have always turned to those small investors "adverse" or that investment in shares, however, also want to invest a large part of their savings to a gain on asset-oriented "safe ", although rather small. Just to name a few, on Web sites (including the Prospectus) of some brokers who advertise these funds (or funds of fund) were read (and read again!), Associated with the funds later marginalized, phrases such "Defense of the capital," "Risk exposure prudent" (from the simplified prospectus AXA U.S. Libor Plus AWF), "low risk", "there may be minor fluctuations in the short term, but in the medium to long term there is NO expectation of capital losses" "Profile of: security-oriented" (from website DWS Investment and the simplified prospectus of DWS Invest Euro Reserve). However, the fund of U.S. Libor Plus Fund Axa AWF on 19/07/2007 lost in one day (!!!) for 12.6% and closed the calendar year with a loss of more than 30% with subscriptions to the fund suspended. Not bad for a fund that promised potential investors a "prudent exposure to risk."
In the above case, you had to do with a fund which, although placed with investors as a financial instrument at low risk, explicitly stated in the prospectus, to invest in U.S. ABS (ABS or asset-backed securities are securities issued by actions securitization primarily - but not only - of mortgages), or those assets which, also incorporating calculator cd. subprime, first sparked the terrible crisis that is still rampant in the markets.
The story of the DWS Invest Euro Reserve, however, is more symbolic and, in the eyes of the writer, gives rise to many perplexities. The class NC of the fund referred to above, having acted for years as a normal Cash (or cash) in the month of September 2008, suddenly was meeting a negative performance plunging by more than 12% between the fourth quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009, generating losses and disastrous for those small investors who had chosen the right sector for its defensive nature and its ability to not cause any loss, if not mild and short-term. On April 30, 2008, however, (Source: Morning Star), the fund lost 8, 49% year to date, and even those who had entered the bottom five years ago, today would be a loss of 0.49%. A "sudden thud" as defined by the "IlSole24Ore" that the same newspaper, in a recent article, says the sale illiquid asset (at any price) in front of a wave of redemptions. This reconstruction, though reliable, is not very thorough because, in this writer's opinion, it goes to the root of the problem. While admitting a sudden high demand for redemptions from investors (September 2008), in fact, does not explain why a fund such as the Euro Reserve should be, precisely, "liquidity" had, when requesting redemptions, asset "illiquid." Even setting aside the fact that the banker should understand if it was the wave of redemptions caused the decline in the fund or if the bottom fell for other leading causes then the effect of redemption (including 30 June 2008 and December 30, 2008 the fund's assets rose from € 595,580,460.47 to € 1,340,425,642.77), it is perhaps useful to go and see what were the types of instruments on which the fund was invested before the terrible fall.
The story of the DWS Invest Euro Reserve, however, is more symbolic and, in the eyes of the writer, gives rise to many perplexities. The class NC of the fund referred to above, having acted for years as a normal Cash (or cash) in the month of September 2008, suddenly was meeting a negative performance plunging by more than 12% between the fourth quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009, generating losses and disastrous for those small investors who had chosen the right sector for its defensive nature and its ability to not cause any loss, if not mild and short-term. On April 30, 2008, however, (Source: Morning Star), the fund lost 8, 49% year to date, and even those who had entered the bottom five years ago, today would be a loss of 0.49%. A "sudden thud" as defined by the "IlSole24Ore" that the same newspaper, in a recent article, says the sale illiquid asset (at any price) in front of a wave of redemptions. This reconstruction, though reliable, is not very thorough because, in this writer's opinion, it goes to the root of the problem. While admitting a sudden high demand for redemptions from investors (September 2008), in fact, does not explain why a fund such as the Euro Reserve should be, precisely, "liquidity" had, when requesting redemptions, asset "illiquid." Even setting aside the fact that the banker should understand if it was the wave of redemptions caused the decline in the fund or if the bottom fell for other leading causes then the effect of redemption (including 30 June 2008 and December 30, 2008 the fund's assets rose from € 595,580,460.47 to € 1,340,425,642.77), it is perhaps useful to go and see what were the types of instruments on which the fund was invested before the terrible fall.
The interim financial statements of the fund as at 30 June 2008, underlined the investment in securitized loans on mortgages (ABS and MBS). Then going through the list of titles that made the fund's assets can be seen that a significant portion of it consisted of long-term bonds. Doing a calculation on the sum of percentage shares of the assets for which the data shows, 30 June 2008, 48,66% del patrimonio medesimo era investito in obbligazioni (in buona parte corporate e bancarie) con scadenza superiore al 2010. Si nota altresì la presenza di titoli obbligazionari con scadenza al 2094, 2064, 2054 e 2042. Così come emerge in modo evidente il fatto che il patrimonio fosse investito in titoli obbligazionari emessi da banche. Banche che, meno di tre mesi dopo, sarebbero state sull’orlo del crack poiché travolte dalla crisi dei mutui cartolarizzati sub prime come Citigroup, Bank of America, Barclays, UBS, HSBC Bank e (ciliegina sulla torta) Royal Bank of Scotland (istituto bancario letteralmente “crollato” sotto i colpi della crisi in atto ed attualmente sotto il controllo pubblico del Governo inglese). The same portfolio composition is substantially confirmed in the balance sheet of the fund at 30 December 2008. As it is possible that in the midst of a financial crisis (unfortunately) epoch, triggered by an operator securitized mortgages held, in the budget of a fund placed in the market and publicized on the website as "low risk" of its securitized mortgages? How is it possible that a fund "liquidity" that, by prospectus, which should have a remaining average term of the bonds on which invests not more than twelve months, incorporating, for almost half its assets in bonds maturing in over two years ? How can that on the eve of the collapse of the banking system that (unfortunately) will be remembered in the annals of finance, a manager of a fund that would invest in money market (even in short-term government bonds) is displayed, in an important way, on bonds of banks like a (much more risky) bond fund type "corporate"? Again, these securities were purchased on regulated markets or directly from private counterparts? If the fund had been invested mostly in Treasury bills (and the like), short-term government securities, repurchase agreements and bank accounts would have to serve in the same form, the severe liquidity crisis that the operator afferma di aver dovuto subire ? Forse gli ABS e gli altri crediti cartolarizzati, su cui il fondo era investito in modo rilevante, hanno la stessa illiquidità di un BOT o di un qualunque altro titolo di stato quotato sui mercati regolamentati ?
Pur volendo prescindere da siffatti, inquietanti interrogativi non si può fare a meno di notare come risulti piuttosto "inusuale" ed "atipico" che un fondo collocato come “Monetario” o “di liquidità” risulti prevalentemente investito in mutui cartolarizzati ed obbligazioni bancarie nel bel mezzo di una crisi finanziaria terribile come quella in attualmente in atto. Si può affermare con sicurezza che gli investitori siano stati “adeguatamente informati” about the real and actual riskiness of the fund's securities on which, specifically, the fund could invest, and on the attitude of the latter to observe the level of risk, "said" by the Company at the inception of the contract to subscribe for shares ?
is not superfluous to recall that the new Article 21 of the Consolidated Finance Act provides that the "qualified entities" (which definition also includes the fund) to provide services and investment activities should, inter alia, "use advertisements fair, clear and not misleading "to silence the general obligation to act" with diligence, fairness and transparency, to better serve the interests of customers and market integrity. "
however, see sold under the name of "liquidity" a segment of that Fund, with assets of over one billion Euro (as of June 30, 2008) certainly gathers the assets of hundreds of thousands of European savers, discovered on the site the same investment company that operates the fund said the money market (ie buying tools "money market") by investing in securities average remaining maturity not exceeding one year; feel then ensure that the fund may experience "slight variations" and that " not There are no expectations of capital losses "and then, finally, to discover that, as a loss of more than 12% in a few months, this same fund incorporates securitized mortgages and bonds in the middle of one of the most violent crisis (triggered their by a wicked excess securitization) in the last century have affected the financial system, generates some concern.
however, see sold under the name of "liquidity" a segment of that Fund, with assets of over one billion Euro (as of June 30, 2008) certainly gathers the assets of hundreds of thousands of European savers, discovered on the site the same investment company that operates the fund said the money market (ie buying tools "money market") by investing in securities average remaining maturity not exceeding one year; feel then ensure that the fund may experience "slight variations" and that " not There are no expectations of capital losses "and then, finally, to discover that, as a loss of more than 12% in a few months, this same fund incorporates securitized mortgages and bonds in the middle of one of the most violent crisis (triggered their by a wicked excess securitization) in the last century have affected the financial system, generates some concern.
However, since this blog is' certainly not a bank but a virtual indictment of peaceful confrontation and clarification, will really appreciate any assistance that the same person should perform DWS to answer the questions posed above. We will be happy to publish fully clarifying any intervention of the company concerned.
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